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Measuring Social Norms and Preferences 
Using Experimental Games: A Guide for 
Social Scientists 
Colin F. Camerer and Ernst Fehr 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe a menu of experimental 
games that are useful for measuring aspects of social norms and 
social preferences. Economists use the term 'preferences' to refer to 
the choices people make, and particularly to tradeoffs between 
different collections ('bundles') of things they value-food, money, 
time, prestige, and so forth. 'Social preferences' refer to how people 
rank different allocations of material payoffs to themselves and 
others. We use the term 'self-interested' to refer to people who do 
not care about the outcomes of others. While self-interest can be a 
useful working assumption, experimental research of the 1980s and 
1990s have shown that a substantial fraction of people in developed 
countries (typically college students) also care about the payoffs of 
others. In some situations, many people are willing to spend 
resources to reduce the payoff of others. In other situations, the 
same people spend resources to increase the payoff of others. 
As we will see, the willingness to reduce or increase the payoff of 
relevant reference actors exists even though people reap neither 
present nor future material rewards from reducing or increasing 
payoffs of others. This indicates that, in addition to self-interested 
behavior, people sometimes behave as if they have altruistic 
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preferences, and preferences for equality and reciprocity.! Reci~ 
procity, as we define it here, is different from the notion 
reciprocal altruism in evolutionary biology. Reciprocity means that 
people are willing to reward friendly actions and to punish hostile 
actions although the reward or punishment causes a net reduction in 
the material payoff of those who reward or punish. Similarly, people 
who dislike inequality are willing to take costly actions to 
inequality, although this may result in a net reduction of their 
material payoff. Reciprocal altruism typically assumes that reci-
procation yields a net increase in the material payoff (e.g. because 
one player's action earns them a reputation which benefits them 
the future). Altruism, as we define it here, means that an actor takes 
costly actions to increase the payoff of another actor, irrespective 
the other actor's previous actions. Altruism thus represents uncon-
ditional kindness while reciprocity means non-selfish behavior 
is conditioned on the previous actions of the other actor. 
Reciprocity, inequality aversion, and altruism can have 
effects on the regularities of social life and, in particular, on 
enforcement of social norms. This is why the examination 
the nature of social preferences is so important for anthropology 
and for social sciences in general. There is, for example, an ongoing 
debate in anthropology about the reasons for food-sharing in smaIl~ 
scale societies. The nature of social preferences will probably have 
large effect on the social mechanism that sustains food-sharing. For 
example, if many people in a society exhibit inequality aversion or 
reciprocity, they will be willing to punish those who do not share 
food, so no fonnal mechanism is needed to govern food-sharing. 
Without such preferences, formal mechanisms are needed to sustain 
food-sharing (or sharing does not occur at all). As we will see there 
are simple games that allow researchers to find out whether there are 
nonns of food-sharing, and punishment of those who do not share. 
In the following we first sketch game theory in broad tenns. Then 
we describe some basic features of experimental design in economics. 
Then we introduce a menu of seven games that have proved useful 
I We defer the question of whether these preferences are a stable trait of people, or 
tend to depend on situations. While many social scientists tend (0 instinctively guess 
that these preferences are traits of people, much evidence suggests that cross-situational 
behavior is not very consistent at the individual level. Note, however, that behavioral 
variations across situations do not imply that preferences vary across situations because 
individuals with fixed preferences may well behave differently in different situations (see 
section on 'Theories of Social Preferences'). 
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in examining social preferences. We define the games fonnally, 
shoW what aspects of social life they express, and describe behavioral 
regularities from experimental studies. The behavioral regularities 
are then interpreted in tenns of preferences for reciprocity, inequity 
aversion, or altruism. The final sections describe some other games 
anthropologists might find useful, and draw conclusions. 
GAMES AND GAME THEORY 
Game theory is a mathematical language for describing strategic 
interactions and their likely outcomes. A game is a set of strategies 
for each of several players, with precise rules for the order in which 
players choose strategies, the information they have when they 
choose, and how they rate the desirability ('utility') of resulting 
outcomes. Game theory is designed to be flexible enough to be used 
at many levels of detail in a broad range of sciences. Players may be 
genes, people, groups, finns, or nation-states. Strategies may be 
genetically coded instincts, heuristics for bidding on the e-Bay 
website, corporate routines for developing and introducing new 
products, a legal strategy in complex mass tort cases, or wartime 
battle plans. Outcomes can be anything players value-prestige, 
food, control of Congress, sexual opportunity, returning a tennis 
serve, corporate profits, the gap between what you would max-
imally pay for something and what you actually pay ('consumer 
surplus'), a sense of justice, or captured territory. 
Game theory consists of two different enterprises: (I) using games 
as a language or taxonomy to parse the social world; and 
(2) deriving precise predictions about how players will play in a 
game by assuming that players maximize expected 'utility' (personal 
valuation) of consequences, plan ahead, and form beliefs about 
other players' likely actions. The second enterprise dominates game 
theory textbooks and journals. Analytical theory of this sort is 
extremely mathematical, and inaccessible to many social scientists 
outside of economics and theoretical biology. Fortunately, games 
can be used as a taxonomy with minimal mathematics because 
understanding prototypical games-like those discussed in this 
chapter-requires nothing beyond simple logic. 
The most central concept in game theory is Nash equilibrium. A 
set of strategies (one for each player) fonn an equilibrium if each 
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player is choosing the strategy which is a best response (i.e. gives 
highest expected utility) to the other players' strategies. Attention 
focused on equilibrium because players who are constantly 
switching to better strategies, given what others have done, 
generally end up at an equilibrium. Increasingly, game theorists are 
interested in the dynamics of equilibration as well, in the form 
evolution of populations of player strategies (Wei bull 1995); 
learning by individuals from experience (e.g. Fudenberg and 
1998; Camerer and Ho 1999). 
Conventions in economic experimentation 
At this point, it is useful to describe how experimental games 
typically run (see Friedman and Sunder 1994; Davis and Holt 
Camerer 2003 for more methodological details). Experimental 
economists are usually interested initially in interactions 
anonymous agents who play once, for real money, without 
municating. This stark situation is not used because it is lifelike 
not). It is used as a benchmark from which the effects of plavHIli:. 
repeatedly, communicating, knowing who the other player is, 
so forth, can be measured by comparison. 
In most experiments described below, subjects are college 
graduates recruited from classes or public sign-up sheets (or 
ingly, email lists, or websites) with a vague description of 
experiment (e.g. 'an experiment on interactive decision-makin 
and a range of possible money earnings. The subjects assemble 
are generally assigned to private cubicles or as groups to 
Care is taken to ensure that any particular subject will not 
precisely whom they are playing. If subjects know 
whom they are playing, their economic incentives may be 
in a way the experimenter does not understand (e.g. they may 
friends earn more) and there is an opportunity for ~~~+, 
interaction which effectively changes the game from a 
interaction to a repeated interaction. 
The games are usually described in plain, abstract language, 
letters or numbers to represent strategies rather than 
descriptions like 'helping to clean up the park' or 'trusting 
body in a faraway place'. As with other design features, 
language is used not because it is lifelike, but as a 
against which the effects of more concrete descriptions 
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measured. It is well-known that there are framing effects, or vio-
lations of the principle of description invariance·-how the experi-
ment is described may matter. For example, in Public Goods 
Games, players who are asked to take from a common pool for 
their private gain typically behave differently than subjects who are 
asked to give to the common pool by sacrificing (Andreoni 1995). 
Subjects generally are given thorough instructions, encouraged to 
questions, and are often given a short quiz to be sure they 
understand how their choices (combined with choices of others) will 
determine their money earnings. Economists are also obsessed with 
offering substantial financial incentives for good performance, and 
experiments have been conducted which show that results 
generalize even when stakes are very large (on the order of several 
days' or even months' wages). 
Since economists are typically interested in whether behavior 
corresponds to an equilibrium, games are usually played repeatedly 
allow learning and equilibration to occur. Because playing 
with the same player can create different equilibria, in 
experiments subjects are rematched with a different subject 
period in a 'stranger' protocol. (In the opposite, 'partner' pro-
a pair of subjects know they are playing each other repeatedly.) 
a design called 'stationary replication', each game is precisely like 
one before. This is sometimes called the 'Groundhog Day' design, 
a movie starring Bill Murray in which Murray's character re-
the same day over and over. (At first he is horrified, then he 
realizes he can learn by trial and error because the events of the day 
repeated identically.) 
subjects make choices, they are usually given feedback on 
the subject with whom they are paired has done (and some-
feedback on what all subjects have done), and compute their 
Some experiments use the 'strategy method' in which 
make a choice conditional on every possible realization of a 
4~L"%%V"H variable or choice by another player (e.g. in a bargaining 
subjects might be asked whether they would accept or reject 
offer the other player could make. Their conditional decision 
enacted after the other player's offer is made). At the end of 
experiment, subjects are paid their actual earnings plus a small 
up' fee (usually US$3-$5). In experimental economics, there 
virtual taboo against deceiving subjects by actively lying about 
experimental conditions, such as telling them they are playing 
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another person when they are not (which is quite common 
social psychology). A major reason for this taboo is that, for 
cessful experimentation, subjects have to believe the infl 
that is given to them by the experimenter. In the long run 
tion can undermine the credibility of the information given to 
subjects. 
The seven examples we will discuss are Prisoner's 
public goods, ultimatum, dictator, trust, gift exchange, and 
party punishment games. Table 3.1 summarizes the definitions 
the games (and naturally occurring examples of them), the 
tions of game theory (assuming self-interest and rational 
experimental regularities, and the psychological interpretation 
the evidence. 
Prisoners' dilemma and public goods games 
Figure 3.1 shows payoffs in a typical Prisoner's Dilemma. The 
and columns represent simultaneous choices by two players. 
cell shows the payoffs from a combination of row and 
player moves; the first entry is the row player's payoff and 
second entry is the column players payoff. For example, (T, S) 
the (Defect, Cooperate) cell means a defecting row player 
when the column player cooperates, and the column player 
Mutual cooperation provides payoffs of H for each player, 
is-by definition of a Prisoner's Dilemma-better than the L 
from mutual defection. However, if the other player plays 
defector earns the T(emptation) payoff T, which is better 
reciprocating and earning only H (since T> H in a 
Dilemma). A player who cooperates against a defector earns 
S(ucker) payoff, which is less than earning L from defecting. 
T> Hand L> S, both players prefer to defect whether 
other player cooperates or not. So mutual defection is the 
Nash (mutual best-response) equilibrium? This equilibrium 
1 It is important to note the distinction between outcomes that are measured 
data or paid in experiments, and the utilities or personal valuations attached 
rewards. Game theory allows the possibility that players get utility from 
other than their own rewards (e.g. they may feel pride or envy if others earn 
money). In practice, however, we observe only the payoffs players earn. For the 
of this chapter. when we assume 'self-interest' we mean that players are solely 
to maximize their own measured earnings in dollars (or food, or some other 
outcome). 
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TABLE 3.1. Continued 
Game 
Ultimatum 
Game 
Dictator 
Game 
Trust 
Game 
Gift 
Exchange 
Game 
Third-Party 
Punishment 
Game 
Definition 
of the game 
Division of a fixed sum 
of money S between a 
proposer and a responder. 
proposer offers x. If 
responder rejects x 
both earn zero, if 
x is accepted the 
proposer earns S - x and 
the responder earns x. 
Like the UG but the 
responder cannot 
reject that is. the 'proposer' 
dictates (S - x. x). 
Investor has endowment S 
and makes a transfer 
y between 0 and S to 
the trustee. Trustee 
receives 3v and can 
send back any x 
between 0 and 3y. 
Investor earns S - Y + x. 
Trustee earns 3y - x. 
'Employer' offers a wage 
w to the 'Worker' 
and announces a desired 
elIoTt level e. If worker 
rejects (II', e) both earn 
nothing. If Worker 
accepts, he can choose 
anye between 1 and 10. 
Then Employer earns 
lOe- wand Worker 
earn w-c(e). ere) is the 
effort cost which is strictly 
increasing in e. 
A and B playa DG. 
C observes 
how much 
of amount 5 is 
allocated to B. 
C can punish 
A but the punishment 
is also costly for C. 
Real life 
example 
Monopoly pricing of a 
perishable good; '11 th 
hour' settlement otTers 
before a time deadline. 
Charitable sharing of a 
windfall gain (lottery 
winners giving 
anonymously 
to strangers). 
Sequential exchange 
without binding 
contracts (buying 
from sellers on 
e-Bay). 
Noncontractibility or 
nonenforceability of 
the performance 
(effort, quality of 
goods) of workers 
or sellers. 
Social disapproval of 
unacceptable treatment 
of others (scolding 
neighbors). 
Predictions 
with rational 
and selfish 
players 
OITer x = E where 
f. is the smallest 
money unit. 
Any x>O is 
accepted. 
No sharing, 
that is, x = o. 
Trustee repays 
nothing: x = O. 
Investor invests 
nothing: y = O. 
Worker chooses 
Experimenta 
regularities, 
references 
Most offers are 
between 0.3 and 0.5S. 
x < 0.2S rejected 
half the time. 
Competition among 
proposers has a 
strong x-increasing 
effect; competition 
among responders 
strongly decreases x. 
GUth. Schmitter bert and 
Schwartze (I 982),b 
Camerer (2003)." 
On average 
'proposers' allocate 
x = 0.2S. Strong 
variations across 
experiments and 
across individuals. 
Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler (I986);h 
Camerer (2003)." 
On average y=O,SS 
and trustees 
repay slightly less 
than 0.55. x is 
increasing in y. 
Berg Dickhaut, 
and McCabe (l995),b 
Camerer (2003).a 
Effort increases with 
Interpretation 
Responders punish 
unfair offers; 
negative reciprocity. 
Pure altruism. 
'Trustees show 
positive reciprocity. 
e = 1. Employer pays 
the minimum wage. 
the wage lV. Employers 
pay wages that are far 
above the minimum. 
Workers accept offers 
with low wages but 
respond with e = I. In 
contrast to the UG 
competition among 
workers (Le. responders) 
has no impact on wage 
offers. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, 
and Riedl (l993)b 
Workers reciprocate 
generous wage 
offers. Employers 
appeal to 
A allocates nothing 
to B. C never 
punishes A. 
Punishment of A is 
higher, the less A 
allocates to B. 
Fehr and fischbacher 
(200Ia)b 
workers' rc<:iprocity 
by offering 
generous wages. 
C sanctions 
violation of a 
sharing norm. 
Note: a Denotes survey papers. b denotes papers that introduced the respective games. 
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Cooperate (C) 
Defect (D) 
FIG. 3. I. Prisoner's Dilemma 
Notc: (Assumption: T> H> L> S). 
Cooperate (C) 
H,H 
T, S 
Defect (D) 
S, T 
L, L 
inefficient because mutual cooperation would render 
players better off. 
Public goods games have an incentive structure similar 
Prisoner's Dilemma games. 3 Every player is best off by 
nothing to the public good, but contributions from everyone Ulna/.4 
make everyone better off. 4 
The following experiment illustrates a typical Public 
Game. There are n subjects in a group and each player has 
endowment of y dollars. Each player can contribute between 
and y dollars to a group project. For each dollar that is contributed 
to the group project, every group member (including those 
contributed nothing) earns m < 1 dollars. The return m thus mea-
sures the marginal private return from a contribution to the 
project (i.e. the amount of her investment which a specific individual 
gets back, in the form of her share of the public good). Since 
subject benefits from the contributions of the others it is possible to 
free ride on these contributions. The parameter m also obeys 
condition mn> 1. The product mn is the total marginal return 
the whole group from a contribution of one more dollar. For each 
dollar that is kept by a subject, that subject earns exactly one dollar, 
The total material payoff 1f of a subject that contributes g dollars is, 
therefore, given by 1f = Y - g + mG where G is the sum of the con.:. 
tributions of all n group members. 5 Self-interested subjects should 
contribute nothing to the public good, regardless of how much the 
3 There is a huge literature on Public Goods Games. For a survey see Ledyard (1995). 
4 In the general case players in the Public Goods Game have an incentive to con-
tribute inefficiently little to the good. In most experimental applications players had an 
incentive to contribute nothing. 
5 In the general ease players may have unequal endowments Yi and they may derive 
unequal benefits m, from the public good G. mi may also depend nonlinearly on G. The 
material payoff of player i can then be expressed as 1Tj ,= Yi -- gi + m,( G) G. However, for 
anthropology experiments it is advisable to keep material payoff functions as simple as 
possible to prevent that subjects are confused. A particularly simple case is given when 
the experimenter doubles the sum of contributions G and divides the total 2Ci among all 
11 > 2 group members. 
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","'-,",f'. subjects contribute. Why? Because every dollar spent on the 
project costs the subject one dollar but yields only a private 
of m < 1. This means that, in equilibrium, all self-interested 
,U~JI"VG~ will contribute nothing to the public good. A group of self-
;-qc£,,,ested subjects earns y dollars in this experiment because G = O. 
since the total return for the group mn is larger than one, the 
as a whole benefits from contributions. If all group members 
their entire endowments y, then G = ny which means each 
!%UI.)llV'~1 earns mny rather than y (which is better because mn is larger 
one). Thus, contributing everything to the group project 
renders all subjects better off relative to the equilibrium of zero 
contributions, but an individual subject does even - better by 
contributing nothing. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods Games are models of 
situations like pollution of the environment, in which one player's 
imposes a harmful 'externality' on innocent parties 
(cooperation corresponds to voluntarily limiting pollution), villa-
gers sharing a depletable resource like river water or fish in a 
common fishing ground with poor enforcement of property rights 
(e.g. Ostrom 2000), and production of a public utility like a school 
or irrigation system that noncontributing 'free riders' cannot be 
easily excluded from sharing. Note also that contributions in public 
goods games are often in the form of time rather than money---for 
example, helping to clean up a public park or standing watch for 
village security. Low rates of voluntary cooperation and contribu-
tion in these games might be remedied by institutional arrange-
ments like government taxation (which forces free riders to pay up), 
or informal mechanisms like ostracism of free riders. (Of course, if 
ostracism is costly then players should free ride on the ostracism 
supplied by others, which creates a second-order public good pro-
blem.) Also, when Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods Games 
involve players who are matched together repeatedly, it can be an 
equilibrium for players to all cooperate until one player defects. 
Sometimes the experimenter wants to allow for stationary replica-
tion but, at the same time, wants to prevent the existence of equi-
libria that involve positive contribution levels. This can be achieved 
by changing the group composition from period to period such that 
no player ever meets another player more than once. 
In the Prisoner's Dilemma, self-interested subjects have an 
incentive to defect. In the Public Goods Game, when m < I, the 
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self-interest hypothesis predicts zero contributions. In experiments, 
however, subjects in one-period Prisoner's Dilemma games coop-
erate about half of the time. In one-period Public Goods Games, 
they contribute an average of a half of their endowment, but the 
distribution is typically bimodal with most subjects contributing 
either everything or nothing. Higher values of the private return m 
lead to higher contributions. Similar effects are obtained in 
Prisoner's Dilemma. An increase in the value of H, relative to T, 
increases the rate of cooperation. Interestingly, pre-play commu-
nication about how much players intend to contribute, which 
should have no effect in theory, has a very strong positive impact on 
cooperation levels in both the Prisoner's Dilemma and Public 
Goods Games (Ledyard 1995; Sally 1995). 
When the Public Goods Game is repeated for a finite number 
periods, interesting dynamic contribution patterns emerge. Irre-
spective of whether subjects can stay together in the same group or 
whether the group composition changes from period to period, 
subjects initially contribute as much as they do in one-period games, 
but contributions decline substantially over time. Approximately 
60-80 percent of all subjects contribute nothing in the final period 
and the rest contribute little. 6 The first ten periods of Figure 3.2 
show the dynamic pattern of average contributions in a standard 
Public Goods Game like the one described above. Another 
important fact is that about half the subjects are 'conditional 
cooperators'--they contribute more when others are expected to 
contribute more and do contribute more (Croson 1999; Fischbacher, 
Giichter, and Fehr 2001). Conditional cooperation is not compa~ 
tible with pure self-interest, but consistent with a preference for 
behaving reciprocally. The studies cited above also indicate that 
6 Initially, many experimentalists interpreted this as a victory of the self-interest 
hypothesis (Isaac, McCue, and Plott 1985). It was thought that at the beginning of the 
experiment subjects do not yet fully understand what they rationally should do (even 
though the incentive to free ride is usually transparent and is often pointed out very 
explicitly in the instructions) but over time they learn what to do and in the final period 
the vast majority of subjects behave self-interestedly. This interpretation is wrong. 
Andreoni (1988) showed that if one conducts a 'surprise' second Public Goods Game 
after the final period of a first game, subjects start the new game with high contribution 
levels (similar to initial levels in the first game). If players had learned to free ride over 
time, this 'restart' effect would not occur; so the dynamic path that is observed is more 
likely to be due to learning by conditional cooperators about the presence and behavior 
of free riders, rather than simply learning that free riding is more profitable. Camerer 
and Weigelt (1988) observed the same kind of restart effect in repeated trust games. 
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about a third of the subjects are purely self-interested, and never 
contribute anything. 
Why do average contributions decline over time? A plausible 
explanation is that each group has a mixture of subjects who 
behave selfishly and others who behave reciprocally. The reciprocal 
subjects are willing to cooperate if the other group members co-
operate as well. However, in the presence of selfish subjects who never 
contribute, reciprocal subjects gradually notice that they are mat-
ched with free riders and refuse to be taken advantage of by them.7 
The unraveling of cooperation over time raises the question of 
whether there are social mechanisms that can prevent the decay of 
cooperation. A potentially important mechanism is social ostra-
cism. In a series of experiments, Fehr and Giichter (2000) intro-
duced a punishment opportunity into the Public Goods Game 
7 The existence of conditional cooperators may also explain framing effects in public 
goods and Prisoner's Dilemma games (see Ross and Ward (1996). If, for example, a 
Prisoner's Dilemma game is described as the 'Wall Street' game, subjects are likely to 
have pessimistic expectations about the other players' cooperation. Conditional 
cooperators are, therefore, likely to defect in this frame. If, in contrast, the Prisoner's 
Dilemma is described as a 'Community' game, subjects probably have more optimistic 
expectations about the cooperation of the other player. Hence, the conditional coop-
erators are more likely to cooperate in this frame. 
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(see also Yamagishi 1966). In their game there are two stages. Stage 
one is a Public Goods Game as described above. In stage two, after 
every player in the group has been informed about the contributions 
of each group member, each player can assign up to ten punishment 
points to each of the other players. The assignment of one pun~ 
ishment point reduces the first-stage income of the punished subject 
by 10 percent but it also reduces the income of the punisher. 
punishment is like an angry group member scolding a free rider, 
spreading the word so the free rider is ostracized--there is some 
to the punisher, but a larger cost to the free rider.) Note that 
punishment is costly for the punisher, the self-interest hypothesis 
predicts zero punishment. Moreover, since rational players 
anticipate this, the self-interest hypothesis predicts no difference 
the contribution behavior between the standard Public 
Game and the game with a punishment opportunity. In both COll-
ditions zero contributions are predicted. 
The experimental evidence rejects this prediction.s In contrast 
the standard Public Goods Game, where cooperation declines over 
time and is close to zero in the final period (see the first ten periods 
Figure 3.2), the punishment opportunity causes a sharp jump 
cooperation (compare period lO with period 11 in Figure 3.2) and 
steady increase until almost all subjects contribute their whole 
endowment. The sharp increase occurs because free riders often 
punished, and the less they give, the more likely punishment 
Cooperators feel that free riders take unfair advantage of them 
as a consequence, they are willing to punish the free riders. 
induces the punished free riders to increase cooperation in the 
lowing periods. A nice feature of this design is that the actual 
punishment is very low in the last few periods-the mere threat 
punishment, and the memory of its sting from past punishments, 
enough to induce potential free riders to cooperate. 
The results in Figure 3.2 are based on a design in which the 
group of players are paired together repeatedly (the 'partner' 
tocol). When the group composition changes randomly from 
to period or when subjects are never matched with the same 
members again (the 'stranger' protocol), cooperation levels 
lower than in the partner design, but the dynamic pattern is 
B In the experiments subjects first participated in the standard game for ten 
After this they were told that a new experiment takes place. In the new 
which lasted again ten periods, the punishment opportunity was implemented. 
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to Figure 3.2. Interestingly, the punishment pattern is almost the 
same in the partner and the stranger protocol. This means that, in 
the partner protocol, the strategic motive of inducing future 
cooperation is not an important cause of the punishment. 
The Public Goods Game with a punishment opportunity can be 
viewed as the paradigmatic example for the enforcement of a social 
norm. Social norms often demand that people give up private 
benefits to achieve some other goal. This raises the question of why 
most people obey the norm. The evidence above suggests an answer: 
some players will punish those who do not obey the norm (at a cost 
to themselves), which enforces the norm. 
Another mechanism that causes strong increases in cooperation is 
communication (Sally 1995). If the group members can commu-
nicate with each other, the unraveling of cooperation frequently 
does not occur. Communication allows the conditional cooperators 
to coordinate on the cooperative outcome and it may also create a 
sense of group identity. 
While Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods Games capture 
important components of social life, they cannot typically distin-
guish between players who are self-interested, and players who 
would like to reciprocate but believe pessimistically that others will 
not cooperate or contribute. Other games are useful for separating 
out these different types of players. Three other games have proved 
useful in separating these two explanations and measuring a wider 
range of social preferences--ultimatum, dictator, and trust games. 
Ultimatum Games 
Ultimatum Games represent a form of take-it or leave-it bargaining 
(Giith, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982). One player, a proposer, 
make only one proposal regarding the division of a fixed amount 
of money S between herself and a responder. The responder can 
the offer x, or reject it, in which case neither player earns 
anything. If the responder accepts, he earns x and the proposer earns 
- x. In theory, self-interested responders will accept any positive 
offer, and proposers who anticipate this should offer the smallest 
possible positive amount (denoted by c in Table 3.1). 
The Ultimatum Game measures whether responders will nega-
tively reciprocate, sacrificing their own money to punish a proposer 
has been unfair. In dozens of experiments under different 
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good that is only produced if all responders reject. Since there is 
always a positive probability to be matched with a self-interested 
responder, who accepts every positive offer, the reciprocal respon-
der's rejection becomes futile. Hence, there is less advantage 
rejecting under competition, even if one has a strong preference 
reciprocity. Competition essentially makes it impossible for players 
to express their concern about reciprocity. Consequently, evidence 
of the self-interested behavior in the face of competition does not 
cast doubt on evidence of reciprocity in other domains. 
The fact that proposers offer on average 40 percent of S might 
due to altruism, a preference for sharing equally, or to a fear 
low offers will be rejected ('strategic fairness'). Although rejection 
rates are lower under competitive conditions there is still a sig-
nificant rate of rejection. Thus, even under competitive conditions 
proposers have reason to fear that very low offers are rejected~ 
Dictator games help separate the fear-of-rejection hypothesis 
the other explanations mentioned above because the responder's 
ability to reject the offers is removed. 
Dictator Games 
A Dicta tor Game is simply a proposer division of the sum S between 
herself and another player, the recipient (Kahneman, Knetsch, 
Thaler 1986; Forsythe et al. 1994). Self-interested proposers should 
allocate nothing to the recipient in the Dictator Game. In experi~ 
ments with students, proposers typically dictate allocations 
assign the recipient on average between 10 and 25 percent of S, 
modal allocations distributed between 50 percent and zero 
Figure 3.5, from Smith 2000). These allocations are much less 
student proposers offer in Ultimatum Games, though most players 
do offer something. Comparing dictator with bilateral Ultimatum 
Games shows that fear of rejection is part of the explanation 
proposers' generous offers, because they do offer less when there can 
be no rejection. But many subjects offer something in the Dictator 
Game, so fear of rejection is not the entire explanation. Moreover, 
the Chaldeans and the employees from Kansas City offer roughly 
the same in the Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game.9 
9 Unfortunately, there are so far not many experiments with non-student popu!a~ 
lions. It is therefore not clear to what extent the results from the Chaldeans (Smith 
20(0) and from the Kansas City workers (Burks et at. 20(1) represent general patterns 
in non-student popUlations. 
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The Dictator Game is a 'weak situation' because there is typically 
no strong norm for a reasonable allocation, so average allocations 
can change dramatically with changes in the experimental design. At 
one extreme, when experimenters take pains to ensure to subjects 
that their individual decisions cannot be identified by the experi-
menter (in 'double-blind' experiments), self-interest emerges more 
strongly (among students): About 70 percent of the proposers 
allocate nothing and the rest typically allocate only 10-20 percent of 
S (Hoffman et at. 1994). At the opposite extreme, when the eventual 
recipient of the proposer's allocation gives a short description of him 
or herself which the proposer hears, the average allocation rises to 
half of S, and allocations become more variable (Bohnet and Frey 
1999). Many proposers give nothing and others give the entire 
amount, as if proposers make an empathetic judgment about the 
recipient's deservingness. These two extremes simply illustrate that 
dictator allocations can be strongly influenced by many variables 
(in contrast to ultimatum offers, which do not deviate too far from 
30-50 percent in most previous experiments with students). 
Trust and gift exchange games 
Dictator games measure pure altruism. An interesting companion 
game is the 'trust game' (see also Camerer and Weigelt 1988 and 
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). In a trust game an investor and 
trustee each receive an amount of money S from the experimenter. 
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The investor can invest all or part of her money by sending 
amount y, between zero and S, to the trustee. The experimenter 
then triples the amount sent, so that the trustee has 3y (in addition 
to her initial allocation of S which is hers to keep). The trustee 
then free to return anything between zero and 3y to the investor. 
The payoff of the investor is S - y + z and the payoff of the 
is 3y - z + S where z denotes the final transfer from the trustee 
the investor. For example, suppose Sis $10 and the investor 
$7, keeping $3. The $7 investment triples to $21. If the 
repays $10 and keeps $11 for herself, then the investor gets a total 
$3 + $10, or $13, and the trustee gets $10 + $11, or $21. Note that 
investors do not invest, then together the two players earn 2S. If 
investor invests everything, the players earn 4S (the trustee's S 
the tripled investment of 3S); so there is a large mutual gain 
trust. The trust game is essentially a Dictator Game in which 
trustee dictates an allocation, but the amount to be allocated was 
created by the investor's initial investment. 
In theory, self-interested trustees will keep everything and 
z = O. Self-interested investors who anticipate this should 
nothing, that is, Y = O. In experiments in several developed coun~ 
tries, investors typically invest about half the maximum on 
although there is substantial variation across subjects. Trustees 
to repay slightly less than y so that trust does not quite pay. 
amount trustees repay increases with y, which can be interpreted 
positive reciprocity, or a feeling of obligation to repay more to 
investor who has exhibited trust. 
Positive reciprocity like the one that shows up in the trust game has 
important implications for the enforcement of informal 
and incomplete contracts. Most social relations are not governed by 
explicit contracts but by implicit informal agreements. Moreovert 
when explicit contracts exist they are often highly incomplete, 
gives rise to strong incentives to shirk (Williamson 1985). 
historians like North (1990) have argued that differences in socIetIes' 
contract enforcement capabilities are probably a major reason 
differences in economic growth and human welfare, and Knack 
Keefer (l997) find that countries with high measured trust 
surveys) have higher economic growth. 
To see the role of reciprocity in the enforcement of 
consider the following variant of the gift exchange game 
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1993}. In the gift exchange game subjects 
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the role of employers or buyers and of workers or sellers, 
respectively. 10 An employer can offer a wage contract that stipulates 
a binding wage wand a desired effort level e. If the worker accepted 
this offer, the worker is free to choose the actual effort level e 
between a minimum and a maximum level. The employer always has 
to pay the offered wage irrespective of the actual effort leveL In this 
experiment effort is represented by a number e between one and ten. 
Higher numbers represent higher effort levels and, hence, a higher 
profit 7r for the employer and higher effort costs c(e) for the worker. 
Thus, the lowest effort level gives the worker the highest material 
payoff but the highest material payoff for the employer is given at 
the maximal effort leveL Formally, the profit 7r from the employment 
of a worker is given by 7r = 10 x e - wand the monetary payoff for 
the experimental worker is u = w - c(e). The crucial point in this 
experiment is that selfish workers have no incentives to provide 
effort above the minimum level of e = 1 irrespective of the level of 
wages. Employers who anticipate this behavior will, therefore, offer 
the smallest possible wage such that the worker just accept the 
contract offer. Reciprocal workers will, however, honor at least 
partly generous wage offers with non-minimal, generous, effort 
choices. The question, therefore, is to what extent employers do 
appeal to workers' reciprocity by offering generous contracts and to 
what extent workers honor this generosity. 
It turns out that in experiments like this many employers indeed 
make quite generous offers. On average, the offered contracts sti-
pulate a desired effort of e = 7 and the offered wage implies that the 
worker receives 44 percent of the total income that is generated if 
the worker indeed performs at e= 7. Interestingly, a relative 
majority of the workers honor this generosity. Most of them do not 
fully meet the desired effort level but they choose levels above e = 1. 
A minority of the workers (about 30 percent) always choose always 
the minimal effort The average effort is e = 4.4-----substantially 
above the selfish choice of e = 1. Moreover, there is also a strong 
positive correlation between effort and wages, indicating positive 
reciprocity. A typical effort-wage relation is depicted in Figure 3.6. 
Thus, although shirking exists in this situation the evidence suggests 
that in response to generous offers, a relative majority of the people 
10 In the following we stick to the employer-worker framing although the experi-
ment could also be presented in a buyer-seller frame. The gift-exchange experiment has 
been conducted in both frames with virtually the same results. 
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are willing to put forward extra effort above what is implied 
purely pecuniary considerations. 
Similar to the Ultimatum Game the regularities in the 
exchange game are quite robust with regard to 
levels. In experiments in which subjects earned on average 
two and three times their monthly incomes the same wage and 
patterns prevaiL Another important result is obtained if 
competition between the workers-similar to the responder 
petition in the Ultimatum Game. While in the Ultimatum 
with responder competition proposers make much lower 
compared to the bilateral case, competition has no impact on 
in the gift exchange game. The reason for this striking result is 
it does not pay for employers to push down wages because 
procal workers respond to lower wages with lower effort levels, 
Third-party punishment games 
Many small scale societies are characterized by extensive 
sharing. A simple game to examine whether food sharing is a 
norm that is enforced by social sanctions has been conducted 
Fehr and Fischbacher (200Ia). The game is called 
punishment game' and has three players. The game between 
A and player B is just a Dictator Game. Player A receives 
endowment of 100 tokens of which he can transfer any amount 
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B, the recipient. Player B has no endowment and no choice to 
Player C has an endowment of fifty tokens and observes the 
of player A. After this player C can assign punishment 
to player A. For each punishment point assigned to player A 
C has costs of one token and player A has costs of three 
Since punishment is costly a self-interested player C will 
never punish. However, if there is a sharing norm player C may well 
nnrusn player A if A gives too little. 
fact, in the above experiments player A is never punished if 
transferred fifty or more tokens to player B. If they transferred 
than fifty tokens the punishment was stronger, the less player A 
transferred. In case that player A transferred nothing she received 
average nine punishment points from player C, that is, the 
payoff of player A was reduced by twenty-seven tokens. This means 
in this three-person game it was still beneficial, from a selfish 
of view, for player A to give say, nothing compared to an 
equal split. If there is more than one player C, who can punish 
A, this may, however, no longer be the case. 
Another interesting question is to what extent cooperation norms 
sustained through the punishment of free riders by third parties. 
have already seen that in the Public Goods Game with pun-
;nk.~"" ... t strikingly high cooperation rates can be enforced through 
punishment. In this game each contribution to the public good 
increases the payoff of each group member by 0.4. Thus, if a group 
free rides instead of cooperation she directly reduces the 
group members' payoff. In real life there are, however, many 
in which free riding has a very low, indeed almost 
imperceptible, impact on the payoff of particular other individuals. 
question then is, whether these individuals nevertheless help 
n~.f~p~;~~ a social norm of cooperation. In case they do a society 
magnifies its capability of enforcing social norms because 
member of a society acts as a potential policemen. 
It is relatively easy to construct cooperation games with pun-
opportunities for third (unaffected) parties. Fehr and 
l*lschbacher (200Ia), for example, have conducted Prisoner's 
Dilemmas in which a member of the two-person group, who played 
Prisoner's Dilemma, observes a member of some other group, 
also played the Prisoner's Dilemma. Then the member of the 
group can punish the member of the second group. Thus, each 
,,""UlV>cO I could punish and could be punished by somebody outside 
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their own two-person group. It was ensured that reciprocal 
ishment was not possible, that is, if subject A could punish 
B, subject B could not punish A but only some third subject 
turns out that the punishment by third parties is surprisingly strong. 
is only slightly weaker than second-party (within group) punishmerl 
THEORIES OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES 
Within economics, the leading explanation for the patterns 
results described above is that agents have social 
(or 'social utility') which take into account the payoffs and 
intentions of others. Roughly speaking, social preference 
assume that people have stable preferences for how money is 
cated (which may depend on who the other player is, or how 
allocation came about), much as they are assumed in economics 
have preferences for food, the present versus the future, how 
their house is to work, and so forth. 11 
Cultural anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists 
sought to explain the origin of these preferences. One idea is that 
the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation or ancestral 
people mostly engaged in repeated games with people they 
Evolution created specialized cognitive heuristics for 
repeated games efficiently. It is well-known in game theory 
behavior which is optimal for a self-interested actor in a 
game with a stranger-such as defecting or free riding, 
ultimatum offers-is not always optimal in repeated games 
partners. In a repeated Ultimatum Game, for example, it pays 
reject offers to build up a reputation for being hard to push 
which leads to more generous offers in the future. In the 
habitat view, subjects cannot 'turn off the habitual behavior stuLPeC1 
by repeated game life in the Environment of Evolutionary rUHU.'~ 
tation when they play single games with strangers in the lab. 
I I A different interpretation is that people have rules they obey about what to 
such as, share money equally if you haven't earned it (which leads to equal-split 
in the Ultimatum Game) (Giith 1995). A problem with the rule-based approach is 
subjects do change their behavior in response to changes in payoffs, in predictable 
For example, when the incremental payoff from defecting against a cooperator 1,-t"nr,Trvl 
T - H above) is higher, people defect more often. When a player's benefit In of the 
good is higher, they contribute more. When the social return from investing in a 
game is lower, they invest less. Any rule-based account must explain why the rules 
bent by incentives. A theory with flexible rules will probably end up looking like a 
of social preferences which explicitly weighs self-interest against other dimensions. 
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important modification of this view is that evolution did not equip 
people with identical hard-wired instincts for playing games, but 
m;:,tead created the capacity for learning social norms. The latter 
can explain why different cultures would have different norms. 
As is common in evolutionary explanations, the unnatural 
habitat theory assumes the absence of a module or cognitive heur-
that could have evolved but did not-namely, the capacity to 
distinguish temporary one-shot play from repeated play. If subjects 
this ability they would behave appropriately in the one-shot 
game. In principle it is testable whether people have the ability to 
distinguish temporary one-shot play from repeated play. Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2003) did this in the context of the Ultimatum Game 
Camerer et al. 2002, in repeated Trust Games). 
They conducted a series often Ultimatum Games in two different 
conditions. In both conditions subjects played against a different 
opponent in each of the ten iterations of the game. In each iteration 
ofthe baseline condition the proposers knew nothing about the past 
behavior of their current responders. Thus, the responders could 
not build up a reputation for being 'tough' in this condition. 
In contrast, in the reputation condition the proposers knew the full 
history of the behavior of their current responders, that is, the 
responders could build up a reputation for being 'tough'. In 
the reputation condition a reputation for rejecting low offers is, of 
course, valuable because it increases the likelihood to receive high 
offers from the proposers in future periods. 
If the responders understand that there is a pecuniary payoff from 
rejecting low offers in the reputation condition one should observe 
higher acceptance thresholds in this condition. This is the prediction 
of the social preferences approach that assumes that subjects derive 
utility from both their own pecuniary payoff and a fair payoff dis-
tribution. If, in contrast, subjects do not understand the logic of 
reputation formation and apply the same habits or cognitive heur-
istics to both conditions, one should observe no systematic differ-
ences in responder behavior across conditions. Since the subjects 
participated in both conditions, it was possible to observe behavioral 
changes at the individual level. It turns out that the vast majority 
(slightly more than 80 percent) of the responders increase their 
acceptance thresholds in the reputation condition relative to the 
baseline condition. This contradicts the hypothesis that subjects do 
not understand the difference between one-shot and repeated play. 
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The above experiment informs us about the proximate 
isms that drive responder behavior in the Ultimatum 
Whatever the exact proximate mechanisms will turn out to be, 
hypothesis that is based on the story that subjects do not 
understand the difference between one-shot and repeated 
seems to be wrong. A plausible alternative hypothesis is 
responders face strong emotions when faced with a low offer 
that these emotions trigger the rejections. These emotions may 
the result of repeated game interactions in our ancestral past 
may not be fine-tuned to one-shot interactions. For 
purposes, behaviorally relevant emotions can be captured 
appropriate formulations of the utility function. This is pvartl,; 
what theories of social preferences do. 
The challenge for all the social preference theories (and 
tionary explanations of their origins) is to explain a lot of results 
different games with one model, and make new predictions 
survive attempts at falsification. For example, why players 
tribute in the standard Public Goods Game at first, then 
contributing; why they punish and contribute in the Public 
Game with punishment opportunities; why responders reject 
offers; why proposers in the Dictator Game give away money; 
many trustees repay trust; why third parties punish defection in 
Prisoner's Dilemma and unfair allocations in the Dictator 
and why competition causes more unequal divisions in UltilmaUlll 
Games but has no impact in gift exchange games. 
Two flavors of models have been proposed---models of inequality-
aversion and models of reciprocity. In inequality-aversion 
players prefer more money and also prefer that allocations be 
equal. Attempting to balance these two goals, players will 
some money to make outcomes more equal. For example, in 
theory of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the players' goals are formalized 
as follows. Let Xi denote the material payoff of player i and Xj 
material payoff of player j. Then, the utility of player i in a 
player game is given by Ui (x) = Xi - Qi (Xi - xJ if player i is worse 
than player j (x) - Xi 2> 0), and UiCx) = Xi - (3/{Xi - X) if player i 
better off than player j (Xi - Xi 2> 0). Qi is a constant that measures 
how much player i dislikes disadvantageous inequality (envy) whilel1, 
measures how much i dislikes advantageous inequality (guilt). 
Qi and fJi are zero players, i is self-interested. Fehr and Schmidt 
assume that, in general, players dislike advantageous inequality 
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than disadvantageous inequality, that is, 0 S fJi S (ti and fJi < 1. For 
(Xi they assumed no upper bound. 12 
An important ingredient of this theory is that the population of 
players is assumed to be heterogeneous-some people act purely 
selfishly and some are inequality-averse. This model predicts all the 
regularities mentioned above: small offers in the Ultimatum Game 
are rejected by envious players with a positive Q and positive allo-
cations in Dictator Games occur when guilty players have a positive 
{3. A positive fJ also explains why trustees repay some money to 
investors in the trust game and why players who expect that the 
other player(s) cooperate in Prisoner's Dilemma and Public Goods 
Games reciprocate cooperation rather than defecting or free riding. 
The theory is consistent with the fact that in the Ultimatum Game 
with responder competition the responders reject much less than in 
the bilateral Ultimatum Game and why, in the gift-exchange game, 
responder competition does not matter. It also is consistent with 
(third party) punishment in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Dictator 
Game and the Public Goods Game. For a quick illustration, con-
sider the Prisoner's Dilemma in Figure 3.7. Note that the numbers 
in Figure 3.7 represent material payoffs and not utilities. 
In Figure 3.8 we show the utilities that are attached with the 
material payoffs of Figure 3.7 if both players have identical pre-
ferences with Q > 0 and fJ> O. In Fehr and Schmidt's theory, if 
player 2 (the column player) is expected to cooperate, player 1 (the 
12 In the general n-person case the utility function of Fehr and Schmidt is given 
by Ui(x) = Xi - n, nIl 2.::
,f, max{x, - X" o} - .13, nIl 2.:: f , max {X, - X,. O}. The term 
max{Xj -- Xi, O} denotes the maximum of -'j - Xi and O. It measures the extent to which 
there is disadvantageous inequality between player i and j. 
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row player) faces a choice between material payoff allocations 
and (3,0). The social utility of (2,2) is U 1(2,2) = 2 because there 
inequality. The social utility of (3,0), however, is U1(3,0) = 3-
because there is inequality that favors the row player. 
player 1 will reciprocate the expected cooperation of player 
p > t J3 (i.e. if player 1 feels sufficiently 'guilty' from defecting). 
player 1 defects and player 2 cooperates, the payoff of player 
Ui3,0) = ° ~ 30:: if player 2 defected instead the utility would 
This means that player 2 will always reciprocate defection 
cooperating against a defector yields less money and more 
Figure 3.8 shows that if p> 1/3, there are two (mutual 
response) equilibria: (cooperate, cooperate) and (defect, defect). 
utility terms, inequality-averse players no longer face a Pri~An£ 
Dilemma. Instead, they face a coordination or assurance game 
one efficient and one inefficient equilibrium (the same as the 
hunt' game described below). If the players believe that the 
player cooperates, it is rational for each of them to cooperate, 
Inequality-averse players are thus conditional cooperators. 
cooperate in response to (expected) cooperation and defect 
response to (expected) defection. The theory is, therefore, also 
sistent with framing effects in the Prisoner's Dilemma (and in 
Goods Games). If the framing of the game makes players 
optimistic about the other players' cooperation, then . 
averse players will cooperate more. 
Inequality-aversion theories are simplified because they 
only the other players' material payoffs into the calculation of 
utility. Reciprocity theories include other players' actions and, 
particular, the intention behind the action, as well. In one important 
formal reciprocity theory (Rabin 1993), player A forms a 
about whether another player B has sacrificed to benefit (or 
her. A likes to reciprocate, repaying kindness with kindness, 
meanness with vengeance. 
13 Note that if the temptation payofT is raised from 3 to T. then a player cooperates 
(3 > (T - 2)/1'. Since the latter expression converges to 1 as T grows larger, a player 
a fixed /3 who cooperates at a T near 2 will switch to defection at some point as T grows 
large; so the model predicts the correct (empirically observed) response to the change in 
payoff structure. 
14 This also means that if a selfish and an inequality-averse player are matched, 
the inequality-averse player knows that the other player is selfish, the unique equili-
brium is (defect, defect). The reason is that the inequality-averse player knows that 
other player will defect and, hence, she will defect, too. 
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In the Prisoner's Dilemma Figure 3.7, for example, suppose the 
roW player is planning to cooperate. Then the column player's 
essentially determines what the row player will get. Since 
possible payoffs are 2 and 0, let's take the average of these, 1, 
be a 'fair' payoff. By choosing to cooperate, the column player 
'awards' the row player the payoff of 2, which is 'nice' because it's 
than the fair payoff of 1.15 Rabin proposes a utility function 
which niceness has a positive value and meanness has a negative 
value, and players care about their own dollar payoffs and the 
product of their own niceness and the niceness of the other player. 
if the other player is nice (positive niceness), they want to be 
nice too, so the product of nicenesses will be positive. But if the 
other player is mean (negative niceness), they want to be negative, 
too, so the product of nicenesses will be positive. While Rabin's 
theory is more analytically difficult than other theories, it captures 
the fact that a single player may behave nicely or meanly depending 
on how they expect to be treated--it locates social preferences and 
emotions in the combination of a person, their partner, and a game, 
rather than as a fixed personal attribute. 
There are also hybrid models that combine the notions of reci-
procity with models of social preferences based on own and other 
players' material payoffs. Charness and Rabin (2002) proposed a 
hybrid model in which players care about their own payoffs, and 
about a weighted average of the lowest payoff anybody receives (a 
'Rawlsian' component) and the sum of all payoffs (a 'utilitarian' 
component). Their theory has a hidden aversion to inequality 
through the emphasis on the lowest payoff. In addition, players also 
care about the actions of the others. Falk and Fischbacher (1998) 
proposed a model that combines reciprocity and inequality aver-
sion. Both the model of Charness and Rabin and of Falk and 
Fischbacher explain some data that Fehr-Schmidt's theory cannot 
explain. This increase in explanatory power comes, however, at a 
cost because these models are considerably more complicated. 
There are an increasing number of experiments that compare 
predictions of competing theories. One important result of these 
experiments is that there is clear evidence for reciprocity beyond 
inequality-aversion (as anticipated by Rabin 1993). Players do not 
15 The degree of niceness is formalized by taking the difference between the awarded 
and fair payofTs, normalized by the range of possible payoffs. In this example, niceness 
is (2-- 1 )/(2 - 0) = ~. 
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only care about the allocation of material payoffs. They also 
about the actions and the intentions of the other players. 
Regardless of which models are most accurate, 
plausible, and technically useful, the important point for 
scientists is that a menu of games can be used to 
social preferences, like the extent to which people weigh 
monetary self-interest with the desire to reciprocate (or 
inequality), both negatively (in Ultimatum Games) and 
(in Trust Games), and with pure altruism (in Dictator Vd1l11;;:5h 
Dozens of experiments in many developed countries, with a 
range of instructions, subjects, and levels of stakes, have <on,,,,,,,, 
much regularity. And simple formal theories have been nr,"'nr",,,,'i: 
which can account for findings that appear to be contradictory 
first blush (e.g. sacrificing money to harm somebody in an 
matum Game, and sacrificing to help somebody in 
Dilemma or Trust Games). Exploring behavior in these games 
much wider range of cultures, at various stages of econOmt~ 
development and with varying patterns of sharing norms, 
ance structures, and so forth, will undoubtedly prove intere", 
and important. In addition, anthropological studies in remote 
sites will serve as an important empirical reminder for economlSl 
and psychologists who currently study these games about how 
narrow the range of cultures they study is. 
WHY DO GAME EXPERIMENTS? AND WHICH GAMES? 
A central advantage of experimental games is comparability 
subject pools (provided great care is taken in controlling for 
ferences in language, purchasing power of outcomes, in 
with experimenters, and so forth). While comparability is 
not perfect, it is surely as good as most qualitative measures. 
further advantage is replicability. The fact that experiments 
replicable is a powerful tool for creating consensus about the 
and their interpretation in the scientific community. 
In fact, experiments conducted in the field by anthropoto!!!S1 
may actually have two large advantages compared to lab 
ments in Western countries that usually (though not always 
college students as experimental subjects. First, since 
pologists are in the field for long periods of time, the cost of 
lecting data is rather low. (Most contributors to this volume 
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noted that the experiment was unusually fun for participants, 
probably more so than for college students raised in a world of 
Nintendo, 500-channel cable TV, and web surfing.) Second, the 
amount of funds budgeted by granting agencies in developed 
countries for subject payments typically have extraordinary 
purchasing power in small-scale societies. As a result, it is easy for 
anthropologists to test whether people behave differently for very 
large stakes, such as a week or month of wages, compared to low 
stakes. Such comparisons are important for generalizing to high-
stakes economic activity, but are often prohibitively expensive in 
developed countries. 
Games impose a clear structure on concepts that are often vague 
or fuzzy. Social scientists often rely on data like the General Social 
Survey, in which participants answer questions such as, 'In general, 
how much do you trust people?' on a 7-point Likert scale. It would 
be useful to have questions about trust that are more concrete, tied 
to actual behavior, and likely to be interpreted consistently across 
people (see Glaeser et al. 2000). A question like 'How much of $10 
would you place in an envelope, knowing it will be tripled and an 
anonymous person will keep as much as they like and give the rest 
back to you?' is arguably a better survey question-it is more 
concrete, behavioral, and easy to interpret. Note that anthro-
pologists also study their subjects much more carefully than experi-
mental psychologists and economists do, so they often have lots of 
behavioral data to correlate with behavior from experimental games. 
Of course, games are reductions of social phenomena to some-
thing extremely simple, but they can always be made more complex. 
A painter who first sketches a line drawing on a blank canvas has 
reduced a complex image to two dimensions of space and color. But 
the line drawing reduction is also a platform on which more com-
plex images can be restored (e.g. it can be painted over to give the 
dimension of color and the illusion of depth). 
From a technical point of view it is often useful to apply the 
so-called strategy method in experiments. In the Ultimatum Game, 
for example, a strategy for the responder stipulates a Yes or No 
response for each possible offer. A simple way of eliciting a 
responder strategy is the elicitation of the responder's minimal 
acceptable offer, x min. If the actual offer is below x min, it is rejected, 
if it is above x min, it is accepted. This method has the big advantage 
that the experimenter not only knows the responder's response to 
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the actual offer but also to all other feasible offers. Very often 
offers in the Ultimatum Game are close to the equal split so 
there are no rejections. In this case the experimenter learns 
about the willingness to accept or reject low offers unless 
strategy method is applied. 
In simple societies the strategy method may sometimes be 
complicated for the subjects. In this case it is advisable to restrict 
set of feasible offers. For example, in the Ultimatum Game 
experimenter may only allow a 90: 10 offer and a 50: 50 offer, 
the responder then has to indicate his response to both potentIal 
offers before he knows the actual offer. For similar reasons as in 
Ultimatum Game, the strategy method, is of course, also useful 
many other games like, for example, the trust or the third 
punishment game. Knowing the trustee's response to all fe<l~1IJ!e 
investments in the Trust Game, or player C's punishment of 
A for all feasible transfers player A can make to player B in 
third-party punishment game, provides a lot more 
compared to the usual method. 
The experimental games described in this chapter are line 
ings, to which richness can be added. For example, most of 
games we described are only played once without 
(the soundtrack of life is muted) and without mutual 
of who the other players are (like the Magritte painting 'The 
in which two people kiss with their heads shrouded in 
Conducting experiments this way is obviously not a deliberate 
choice to model a world in which people don't talk and only 
hooded strangers (although it might be appropriate for 
anonymous internet transactions). Instead, this baseline design 
stark control condition that can be used to study the effect 
communication, by comparing results in the control condition 
experiments in which communication is allowed (turning up 
soundtrack volume) and mutual identification is allowed (rpnllW' 
the hoods). 
Other games social scientists might find useful 
While the games described above have been studied most 
(including by anthropologists; see this volume) other games 
treatments might also be of interest. This section describes four 
of them. 
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Measuring moral authority in dictator games As noted above, the 
Dictator Game is a weak situation in the sense that a wide variety of 
treatment variables-instructions, entitlement, experimental con-
trol for 'blindness' to individual allocations, identification of 
recipients, etc.~-affect allocations significantly. The fact that prefer-
ences are malleable suggests a way to measure moral authority, 
which was very cleverly suggested by Carolyn Lesorogol. Collect a 
group of subjects. Have a person A suggest a way the subjects 
should play the Dictator Game. Then have the subjects play. The 
extent to which subjects adhere to A's recommendation is a measure 
of A's moral authority or ability to create norms which are adhered 
to. (Lesorogol used this method to see whether traditional 
authority, of village elders, had declined after land privitization.) 
Coordination: Assurance and threshold public goods games 
Figure 3.9 shows a game called 'stag hunt', also known as an 
'assurance game' or Wolfs Dilemma. The game is identical to the 
Prisoner's Dilemma in structure except for one crucial difference: It 
is better to reciprocate cooperation, because the material payoff to 
defecting when the other player cooperates is lower than the 
material payoff from cooperating. If there are strong synergies or 
'complementarities' from the cooperative choices of two players, or 
if free riders are punished after they defect, then the Prisoner's 
Dilemma game is transformed into stag hunt. 16 
The game is called stag hunt after a story in Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau about hunters who can choose to hunt a large stag with 
others, which yields a large payoff if everyone else helps hunt the 
stag, or can hunt for rabbit on their own. An example familiar to 
anthropologists is hunting for large animals like whales (see Alvard, 
16 Recall that when players are inequality-averse the PD, when represented in social 
utility terms, is transformed into an assurance game. From an experimental viewpoint, 
this is, however, different from an assurance game where the payoffs are monetary. 
While the experimenter has full control over the monetary payoffs we can never be sure 
about the preferences of the players. 
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Chapter 14, this volume), in which the marginal hunter's presence 
can be crucial for a successful hunt. Stag hunt is a 'coordination 
game' because there is more than one Nash equilibrium, 
players would like to find a way to coordinate their choices on one 
equilibrium rather than mismatch. Since stag is a best-response 
hunting stag, (stag, stag) is an equilibrium; but so is (rabbit, rabbit). 
Stag hunt is closely related to 'threshold' Public Goods ~U"U'"il> 
(also called the 'volunteer's dilemma'). In these games there is 
threshold of total contribution required to produce the public 
If n-l players have contributed, then it pays for the nth player 
pitch in and contribute, since her share of the public good 
weighs the cost of her marginal contribution. 
The central feature of the Prisoner's Dilemma is whether 
other player has social preferences that induce her to cooperat~ 
(acting against her self-interest) and whether the player himself 
social utility from reciprocating cooperation. Stag hunt is different: 
because players get a higher material payoff from reciprocating 
cooperative choice (stag), all they need is sufficient assurance 
others will hunt stag (i.e. a probability of playing stag above ~, 
which makes the expected payoff from stag higher than the expected 
payoff from rabbit) to trigger their own stag choice. The Prisoner's 
Dilemma game is about cooperativeness; how cooperative is playet 
1 and how cooperative does he expect player 2 to be. Stag hunt 
solely about perceptions of whether others are likely to cooperate, 
Experiments with coordination games like stag hunt show 
perhaps surprisingly, the efficient (stag, stag) outcome is not always 
reached. Preplay communication helps. Social structure has 
interesting effect: if a population of players are matched randomly 
each period, the tendency to play stag is higher than if players are 
arrayed on a (virtual) circle and play only their neighbors 
period. Stag hunt could be useful to measure whether a culture has a 
norm of playing 'stag' when the cooperative action is risky. 
Status in bargaining Figure 3.10 shows a game called 'battle of the 
sexes'. In this game, two players simultaneously choose a 
R C 
R 3, 1 0, ° 
C 0, ° 1, 3 
FIG. 3.10. Battle of the Sexes Game 
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we have labeled Rand C. If the players mismatch, they get 
nothing. If they match on R, the row player gets the higher payoff 
of 3 and the column player gets 1. The payoffs are opposite if they 
match on C. The game is called battle of the sexes after a hoary 
story about a husband and wife who would like to attend an event 
together, but the husband prefers boxing while the wife prefers 
ballet. 
Battle of the sexes is a classic 'mixed-motive' game because the 
players prefer to agree on something than to disagree, but they 
disagree on what to agree on. Alternatively, think of the .game as a 
bargaining game in which the players will split 4 if they can agree 
how to split it (but it must be uneven, 3 : 1 or 1 : 3) and earn nothing 
otherwise. 
In experiments with payoffs like Figure 3.10, players tend to 
choose their preferred strategy (row chooses R, column chooses C) 
around 65 percent of the time, which means they mismatch more 
than half the time (see Camerer 2003: ch. 7). Since mismatches yield 
nothing, the game cries out for some social convention or coordi-
nating device which tells players which one of them gets the larger 
payoff; in principle, the player who gets less should go along with 
the convention since getting 1 is better than mismatching and get-
ting nothing. 
Any commonly understood variable which produces consistent 
matches in a pair of players can be interpreted as an indicator of 
status. A striking illustration of this is Holm's (2000) experiments 
on battle of the sexes and gender. He ran experiments in which men 
and women played battle of the sexes games (simultaneously, with 
no communication) with players of the same sex and opposite sex. 
Take the row player's view. When women played with men, the 
women (in the row player position) were more likely to play C and 
men (in the row player position) where more likely to play R, 
compared to when they played with subjects of the same gender. 
The players played as if they all respected a social convention in 
which women get the smaller share and the men the larger share. 
Remarkably, women actually earned a larger average payoff play-
ing against men than playing against other women! The reason for 
this is that earning 1 with a high probability is better than trying to 
earn 3 but mismatching very frequently. 
We interpret these results as evidence that males have status. An 
agreed-upon status variable has two interesting effects in these 
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games: It increases collective gains (by minimizing mismatches); 
it creates greater wealth for the high-status group than for the 
status group. The latter effect, of course, can spark a self-fulfilling 
spiral in which, if wealth itself creates status, the rich get status 
. h 17 get nc er, too. 
Since concepts of hierarchy, privilege, and status are central 
anthropology (and in sociology), games like battle of the sexes 
which reveal status relations (and show their economic UH!JQ'~t 
could prove useful. Game-theoretic revelation of status also pro", 
vides a way for economists to comprehend such concepts, which 
not fit neatly into primitive economic categories like preferences 
beliefs. 
Shared understanding and cultural homogeneity in matching 
In 1960, Schelling drew attention to simple 'matching games', 
which players choose an object from some category, and earn 
fixed prize if their objects match. For example, subjects who 
asked to choose a place and time to meet in New York City 
choose noon at Grand Central Station, or other prominent land-
marks like Central Park or the Statue of Liberty. Careful experi-
ments by Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (1994) show the same effect 
Asked to name a mountain, 89 percent of subjects picked 
Everest; naming a gender, 67 percent picked 'man'; naming a rela-
tive, 32 percent picked 'mother' (20 percent picked 'father'); asked 
pick a meeting place in London, 38 percent picked Trafalgar Square; 
and so forth. 
From a game-theoretic viewpoint, matching games with a 
choice set have lots and lots of equilibria. Schelling's point was that 
shared world knowledge often picks out a psychologically promi-
nent 'focal' point. A focal point is the right choice if 'everybody 
knows' it's the right choice. The extent of shared understanding can 
be measured by how well subjects match. We suggest this as a 
measure of cultural homogeneity. For example, Los Angeles is a 
diverse patchwork of local communities of wildly varying ethnicity. 
Asked to choose a meeting place in LA (playing the game with their 
own ethnic or geographical community), Koreans might choose the 
J 7 An alternative interpretation is that Battle of Sexes play reflects the extent to 
which the aggressiveness of the other player is common knowledge. If all women believe 
that men are more aggressive, it pays for them to give in. Yet, if wealth creates status, 
than the greater aggressiveness of men ultimately also confers status. 
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corner of Western and Wilshire (the heart of 'Koreatown'), those 
from south beach might choose 'The Strand' (a boardwalk by the 
ocean), Hollywood Hills trendies would choose Skybar, and so 
forth. The fact that most readers haven't heard of all these 'famous' 
places is precisely the point. The degree to which a group coordinates 
on a culturally understood meeting place seems like a good measure 
of overall cultural homogeneity. (If they do not agree, they aren't a 
group---at least not a group with shared cultural knowledge.) 
Weber and Camerer (2003) use matching games, with a linguistic 
twist, to study endogenous development of culture and cultural 
conflict. In their experiments, a pair of subjects are each shown 
sixteen pictures which are very similar (e.g. scenes of workers in an 
office). One subject is told that eight of the pictures have been 
selected as targets. This subject, the director, must describe the 
pictures to the second subject, so that the second subject chooses the 
correct pictures as quickly as possible. (They earn money for 
accuracy and speed.) Since the subjects have never seen these pic-
tures before, they must create a homemade language to label the 
pictures. Because they are under time pressure, with repeated trials 
they create a very pithy 'jargon' to describe the distinctive features 
of a picture as briefly as possible. Their homemade language is one 
facet of culture (albeit designed to accomplish a specific purpose-
commonly understood labeling of novel objects). Cultural conflict 
can be studied by combining two separate groups, whose jargon 
tend to be different. 
These paradigms can be used to measure or create shared 
understanding, with economic incentives to reveal shared under-
standing or create it quickly. These could prove useful in anthro-
pology too for measuring cultural homogeneity and dimensions of 
shared perception. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Game theory has proved useful in a wide range of social sciences in 
two ways: by providing a taxonomy of social situations which parse 
the social world; and by making precise predictions about how self-
interested players will actually play. Behavior in experiments which 
carefully control players' strategies, information, and possible 
payoffs shows that actual choices often deviate systematically from 
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the game-theoretic prediction based on self-interest. These 
tions are naturally interpreted as evidence of social norms 
players expect and feel obliged to do) and social preferences 
players feel when others earn more or less money). This evidence 
now being used actively by economists to craft a parsimonious 
theory of social preferences that can be used to explain data 
many different games in a simple way that makes fresh predictions; 
Since anthropologists are often interested in how social norms 
preferences emerge, evolve, and vary across cultures, these games 
could provide a powerful tool for doing empirical anthropology. 
addition to measuring social preferences and social norms 
mental games may also be used for measuring moral authority, 
players beliefs about other players' actions in coordination games, 
cultural homogeneity, and status effects in bargaining. 
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